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 In this short, speculative and very preliminary paper I 
want to consider some aspects and correlates of adoption in the 
Middle East. Traditionally, adoption there has been, and 
continues to be, held in low esteem.  Not one single Middle 
Eastern country has ratified the Hague convention on 
intercountry adoption, which is aimed at rationalizing 
procedures for foreigners who wish to adopt local children when 
no adopting parents can be found locally.  The reluctance of 
Middle Eastern states to endorse this measure reflects the 
belief of Muslim clerics that it would be sacrilege for orphaned 
children to be raised outside of the Islamic community - though 
it is perfectly permissible to adopt infidel children into a 
Muslim household.    
 Paradoxically, the reluctance of Muslims to permit 
interfaith adoption is a reflection of the fact that Islam is 
itself a community of fictive siblings, united under the 
spiritual parenthood of the Prophet Muhammad.  As Hamid Dabashi 
notes, from its beginnings in the Arabian desert, "Muhammad's 
charismatic authority established a new order of social 
solidarity. It substituted brotherhood-in-faith for brotherhood-
in-blood, which went against traditional Arab practices" i.  
According to the Quran, "You will not find a people believing in 
God and the Last Day/ who love those who oppose God and his 
messenger,/ even though they were their fathers, sons, brothers 
or clan" ii.  In the early days of Islam, hostility between 
believers and non-believers was so great that one could not pray 
for a non-Muslim member of one's own family, and one convert 
offered to kill his own father because he was a leader of 
Muhammad's opponents. Severance of blood ties in favor of ties 
to the faith is symbolized today in the crucial event of the 
pilgrimage to Medina, the hijra, which literally means "leaving 
the `protection' of one group and entering that of another" iii. 
 Although the Muslim community set itself against the 
commuity of the patrilineage, it did so by replicating and 
expanding many of the functions of the Middle Eastern patriclan. 
For instance, within the clan shedding of blood was forbidden 
and co-responsibility was enjoined; property also could not be 
alienated from the clan.  Similarly, Muslims were strictly 
prohibited from exploiting, injuring or enslaving one another; 
they were obliged to share their resources through charitable 
contributions that would be redistributed to the community at 
large.  And, just as tribal unity in the Middle Eastern context 
was traditionally activated primarily in contests with other 
patrilineages, so too in Islam the opposition between the realm 
of faith and the realm of unbelief implied a continuous battle.  
In the holy war Muslims must aid Muslims, just as patrikin must 
help patrikin - an extension of kinship that helped solidify 
Bedouin warriors into a world-conquering army. 
 The new sacred community in which Muslims found protection 
and empowerment was called the umma, the assembly of believers - 
a term that also has associations with motherhood, since mother 
in Arabic is `umm' - as opposed to the paternal clan (`nasab' or 
`qawm'), which is the source of secular power.  Unlike clan 
membership, joining the Muslim umma was a voluntary matter; as 
Muhammad said, "there is no compulsion in religion".  Islam is 
the easiest of religions to join; one merely has to recite the 
profession of faith.  But once this has been done then a Muslim 
was forever committed, and could not repudiate membership on 
pain of death as an apostate. Lacking the potent ideology of 
paternal blood to bind believers together, the umma relied on 
such sanctions to maintain its unity. Like kinship, the bond 
between believers was perceived to be a tie that was unbreakable 
- to deny it was to deny one's own identity; the most heinous of 
offenses, punishable by death.   
 In a real sense, the Islamic emphasis on the solidarity of 
the religious community mirrored the experience of Muhammad 
himself. He was the posthumous son of his father, whose mother 
died when he was young. Alone in the world, impoverished and 
endangered, Muhammad was raised by his father's brother, and 
relied on his protection for his survival.  At the death of his 
uncle, he was obliged to flee from Mecca, fearing the hatred of 
his more distant paternal uncles, who remained his major rivals 
in the early years of prophecy.  Muhammad therefore had seen for 
himself the cruelty of a patrilineal society toward those who 
are without family, and a major emphasis in his teaching was on 
the obligation of Muslims to protect the weak, and especially to 
care for orphans iv.  He himself brought into his family a number 
of outsiders, including the Persian Salman Farisi, the Syrian 
slave Zayid al'Harithi, and the African slave Bilal.  The new 
family of Islam, Muhammad said, would be more generous than the 
old family of blood.  The only rub is that one cannot leave the 
umma, but must be succored within it. 
 In the Islamic fictive family, Muhammad took the place of 
the patriarch, presiding as the spiritual guide for his people, 
conveying God's messages to them, inspiring their obedience, 
serving as judge, counsel, mediator and guide.  Yet he claimed 
no family relationship with God for himself; he was, he said, 
not `the son of God' - that would be blasphemy.  He was only the 
warner, the vehicle for God's word.  But his followers naturally 
took him to be an extraordinary being, graced with charisma and 
`close to God'.  After his death, the problem of succession 
loomed large, especially as Muhammad had no sons, so that the 
usual tribal mode of patrilineal inheritance could not be 
followed. 
 Different factions of the umma, representing various clans, 
sought to reassert the old genealogical charter, claiming their 
leaders should take Muhammad's place, but others rightly argued 
that this would destroy the spiritual unity of the congregation; 
the compromise was the selection of Abu Bakr, whose main 
qualification for leadership was not blood descent, but his 
friendship with the Prophet, plus the fact that he had led 
communal prayers when Muhammad was absent.  Rejecting this 
solution, some erstwhile believers ceased to pay their tribute 
to the center, and were only subdued with difficulty.  In the 
next generations, questions of spiritual succession continued to 
plague Islam.  Jealousy over the third Caliph's tendency to 
favor his own noble lineage led to his assassination, and the 
whole umma was finally torn apart in warfare over the succession 
of the Prophet's son-in-law and paternal first cousin, Ali, 
ending in the defeat of his family.  
 Henceforth, Islam would be riven by many battles over who 
had the right to speak for the community.  The mainstream Sunnis 
accepted the fact of secular ruler, but the supporters of Ali, 
later known Shi'ites, continued to argue that their leaders, 
descended from Ali and his wife Fatima, possessed a special 
spiritual superiority and therefore had the intrinsic 
prerogative to rule. They thus combined a genealogical charter 
with a notion of the transmission of esoteric knowledge.  
However, these two legitimizing factors could be separated, and 
sometimes were.  For instance, some Shi'ite extremists, notably 
the Qarmathians, proclaimed that Salman Farisi, a Persian 
incorporated into the Prophet's family by adoption, was actually 
the proper successor to Muhammad. According to the Qarmathians, 
Muhammand was the bearer of outward truth, Ali the bearer of 
inner truth, but Salman was the gateway to knowledge, raised 
above them both in sanctity.  In principle, then, anyone 
similarly enlightened could become the spiritual guide of 
Muslims, thereby obliterating all principles of blood in favor 
of the rule of supernatural succession.  Salman remains an 
important figure in mystical Islam, especially among non-Arabs. 
 Yet, despite Muhammad's warnings against genealogical 
loyalties, despite his own history as an orphan and the quasi-
family status he offered to Salman, Zayid and Bilal, and despite 
the emphasis later placed on the spiritual bond between master 
and disciple, in fact adoption of children from outside the 
immediate extended family continues to be extremely rare 
throughout the Middle East.  In Islamic law, such children, if 
they are taken in, have no automatic rights of inheritance, in 
contrast to the children of slave women, who have a full legal 
share in the patrimony.  The antipathy toward adopted children 
is a consequence of the powerful patrilineal blood ideology of 
Middle Eastern peoples, which was challenged but never 
superseded by the communal message of Islam.  This ideology 
insists that those descended from a common forefather have a 
shared substance, an equivalence made explicit in feuds, wherein 
the blood of any member can serve as payment for injuries done 
by any other.  In this belief system, the shame or glory of any 
clansman or woman reveals the character of all his or her 
fellows.   
 Even Muhammad's own lineage, the Quraysh, were not immune 
from pride in blood; the Caliph Umar argued that since Muhammad 
was the most noble of human beings, his people, the Quraysh, 
must be the most noble clan, and "for the rest, it follows 
proximity.  The Arabs were ennobled by the Apostle of God" v.  
Such proud reference to one's pedigree is an ancient part of 
Middle Eastern culture, where noble tribes made their major art 
form the recitation of poetry praising their paternal ancestors, 
and where marriage was as `close to the bone' as possible in 
order to maintain the purity of their blood line.  Elite 
lineages traditionally bragged that kinship connections were 
sought with them, while they, as the most noble clans, did not 
initiate ties with others vi. The old entrenched faith in 
aristocratic blood lines, intrinsically contradictory to the 
egalitarian ideology of the embracing umma, continued as tribes 
became Muslims en masse, following their leading men, and 
persisted in making claims for their own clan's noble blood, 
refusing to intermarry with others. 
 Ibn Khaldun, the great medieval theorist of Middle Eastern 
society, described this belief system in a way that most Middle 
Easterner's would understand. "Everybody's affection for his 
family and his group is more important (than anything else).  
Compassion and affection for one's blood relations and relatives 
exist in human nature as something God put into the hearts of 
men.  It makes for natural support and aid, and increases the 
fear of the enemy.  Those who have no one of their own lineage 
rarely feel affection for their fellows" vii. 
 Of course, as many anthropologists have demonstrated at 
great length, this is an ideal model of relationship - one that 
is manipulated, avoided, or suborned in an infinite number of 
ways by social actors seeking their own advantages.  But 
malleability does not mean that cultural forms and the 
affections they generate are non-existent.  Instead, such forms 
serve, according the Max Weber's famous metaphor, as switchmen, 
orienting the direction of interest.  Ibn Khaldun himself knew 
that blood ties do not create solidarity in themselves.  To be 
activated they require "social intercourse, friendly 
association, long familiarity, and the companionship that 
results from growing up together, having the same wet nurses, 
and sharing in other circumstances of death and life" viii.  
 Outsiders, who were clients, slaves or allies of the tribe, 
could be included within these friendly associations, and 
treated as quasi-kinsmen, just as Muhammad brought Salman into 
his own intimate family.  Eventually, this relationship of 
fosterage might be cemented by marriage, and the slave-client's 
children and grandchildren could become accepted as members of 
the lineage.  Yet, in times of stress, the absence of an ancient 
patrilineal blood link might well be cited as a reason for 
exclusion, or as the source of the moral weakness of a 
particular group.  The interplay between equalizing blood ties 
and the ties of dependency serves as a continuous theme in 
Middle Eastern history, especially when tribal groups conquered 
state systems.  
 As Ibn Khaldun documented, the conquering tribal leader 
originally relied upon his co-equal patrilineal blood kinsmen 
for support, but the conqueror's descendent "seeks the help of 
clients and followers against the men of his own people" ix.  The 
gradual disenfranchisement of kinsmen occurs because the ruler 
fears that they, as his co-equals and tribal brothers, born of 
the same lineage, can and will make claims on his sovereignty.  
In response, he replaces them with slaves, clients and hired 
employees who are directly reliant on him for their positions.  
The ruler's aim is to increase his authority by exchanging his 
potential rivals for a covey of dependents.  These dependents, 
or mawali, were often conceptualized as the `children,' `milk 
brothers' or even `foster fathers' of the ruler - inferior in 
terms of blood, but bound to him by ties of dependency, loyalty 
and affection.  Where blood relatives made inconvenient claims 
for equal rights due to their shared blood, clients could easily 
be set aside.  This aspect of clientship was well described by 
the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur: "When I sit in public audience, I 
may call a mawla and raise him and seat him by my side, so that 
his knee will rub my knee.  As soon, however, as the audience is 
over, I may order him to groom my riding animal and he will be 
content with this and will not take offence" x. 
 The incorporation of dependents as inferior quasi-family 
follows ancient Arab and Israeli custom.  Among them, slaves and 
clients could be made second-class members of the lineage, 
retaining the name of their master's tribe even after gaining 
freedom.  This relationship was often cemented by ties of milk, 
which explicitly served as an alternative to the bond of blood, 
as boys who had suckled at the same breast were believed to have 
a special bond between them.  Milk relationships have a long 
history in the Middle East.  Traditionally, urban infants were 
sent to a tribal wetnurse, establishing strong ties with her and 
her clan; as adults these `milk brothers' were morally obliged 
to aid one another.  Muhammad himself had fictive kinship with a 
clan of the Hawazin Bedouin, who had nursed him as an infant.  
This clan refused to make war on Muhammad until pressed hard, 
and when the foster-sister of his wetnurse was captured, 
Muhammad released her with gifts, thus overturning the rules of 
booty xi.  This `milk relationship' can be found in contemporary 
societies as well. Alois Musil noted that Rwala Bedouin chiefs 
entered into a connection with the family of his wet nurse that 
was almost as strong as his ties with his own patriline, and 
much warmer emotionally xii. I found the same phenomenon among 
the Swat Pukhtun, where elite men had close relationships with 
the clients whose wives had suckled them as children.  While 
one's own father was held in respect and feared as a rival, 
one's `foster father' was treated with affection as a loyal 
supporter and adviser xiii.   
 Such ties of trust and shared nurturance could then be 
extended to political office. This pattern is most striking in 
the institution of the vizier, who traditionally served as the 
Middle Eastern king's closest and most influential counselor.  
According to Goitein, viziers were originally brought into the 
king's family as personal servants and teachers of the princes, 
whom they later advised. As he writes: "The bonds between the 
slave or freedman and his lord - often strengthened by `milk 
relationship' - are regarded as the truest safeguards for the 
well-being of the latter" xiv.  Among the Seljuks, the vizier was 
even referred to as `father' by the King.  However, this did not 
keep Sultan's from killing viziers when they became too 
powerful, or when their advice was inconvenient - an act leading 
to none of the repercussions that would follow from killing 
one's own brother or father. 
 Despite its advantages for the ruler, Ibn Khaldun argued 
for the negative effect of favoring dependent clients tied by 
bonds of milk and affection over one's own patriline. The ruler 
does gain more leeway for exercising his own autocratic 
authority by this practice; but, according to Ibn Khaldun, 
without kinsmen and allies of his own people to support him, he 
is instead surrounded by flatterers and sycophants, and can be 
easily ousted by more aggressive and unified tribal opponents 
invading his realm from the periphery.  This is because clients, 
slaves and hangers-on lack the essential ingredient that 
promotes social solidarity and self-sacrifice: shared blood. 
 The ideology of shared paternal blood also has great impact 
in terms of personal and familial relationships. When purity of 
paternal blood is a central cultural value, then veiling, female 
seclusion, and enforced chastity follow. Although often thought 
to be Muslim in origin, these customs actually far predate the 
Islamic advent, and all derive from continuous efforts to 
control the sexuality and independence of women, in order to 
ensure an unsullied patrilineal blood line.  It is for this 
reason in particular that adoption has remained almost 
inconceivable in the Middle East, despite the example of 
Muhammad. 
 Historians and cultural anthropologists usually argue that 
the steady subordination of women in the Middle East derived 
from a complex nexus of influences, including the increased 
division of labor and concomitant status hierarchies that fueled 
the growth of the local polities from parochial city-states to 
cosmopolitan empires.  It is often argued that this process 
necessarily entails greater male dominance, as patrilineal 
inheritance is initiated to control rights to ever-more valuable 
permanent property, while patriarchal power is used to retain 
legal authority over women who could potentially disrupt the 
solidarity of the group by their marriages and independence.   
 This transformation is often seen as the culmination of 
earlier civilizational changes, dating from the substitution of 
plow agriculture for hunting and gathering, which led in turn to 
more surplus accumulation, greater distinction between male and 
female labor, the rise of male elites, and the development of 
female seclusion as a way of asserting masculine status 
distinctions.  In all cases, subordination of women is tied to 
the rise of patrilineal and patrilocal social organization, 
which binds women to their fathers and husbands. 
 However, I want to argue here that things are not quite so 
clear-cut.  Certainly, the mode of production does make a 
difference when women's outdoor work is absolutely necessary for 
survival, as is the case among Middle Eastern nomads, where the 
necessities of production require women to work unveiled and to 
enjoy quite substantial freedom in decision-making, since they 
have to take responsibility for the household during the 
frequent absences of their husbands.  But female freedom does 
not alter the strongly patriarchal morality of the tribesmen.  
Nomadic women are actually much less likely than urban women to 
be granted any inheritance whatsoever, and they are more likely 
to suffer corporal punishment for adultery or other offenses, 
despite the protection offered by Islamic law.  Nor can they 
adopt children from outside the patrilineal community.  A simple 
and co-operative mode of production alters the parameters of 
patriarchy, but does not necessarily preclude it.  
 It is also not evident that the combination of social 
complexity, patrilineality and status differentiation 
necessarily implies an ideology of female inferiority. In the 
Middle East itself we find a powerful counterexample: Egypt 
during the New Kingdom was a supremely hierarchical complex 
society, yet women could own property, inherit, act as legal 
individuals, make provisions in marriage contracts, initiate 
divorce, and so on.  Marriage, save for that of the Pharaoh, was 
monogamous.  There was no veiling or female seclusion, and women 
were treated with respect and dignity, despite male dominance in 
the political, professional and religious spheres.  Most 
importantly, except for royalty xv, there was no great concern in 
Egypt for insuring the paternity of a child, and families 
without sons commonly adopted an heir xvi. 
 The common presence of adoption reveals that the ordinary 
people in the New Kingdom were unconcerned with blood purity - 
which sets them off decisively from people in the rest of the 
Middle East.  I believe the reasons for this anomaly derive from 
some of the other unique characteristics of ancient Egypt, and 
offer an instructive insight into some of the social factors 
that favor an ideology of blood.  Where the rest of the Middle 
East was characterized by strong notions of personal freedom and 
self-aggrandizement within an unstable and sparse environment 
that favored continual internal struggles for ephemeral 
positions of power among co-equal rivals, in the fertile, 
isolated and relatively secure environment of ancient Egypt 
ordinary men and women were encapsulated in a stable and 
hierarchical social order ruled by a sacred Pharaoh and his 
priesthood.  In this universe ordinary Egyptians required no 
notions of `natural' differences of blood or sex to ratify the 
taken-for-granted hierarchies of the kingdom; nor did ordinary 
Egyptians have any interest in the preservation of their 
bloodlines or in controlling reproduction by enforcing female 
isolation.   
 The Egyptian case shows that there is no absolute and 
necessary connection between social complexity, patrilineality, 
anxiety over female purity, and an ideology of female 
inferiority. That connection requires faith in an idiom of blood 
inheritance as the crucial factor in determining identity within 
an otherwise fluid social world. This belief is so deeply 
ingrained that it is regarded as `natural' by Middle Easterners, 
but in fact it is perfectly possible for a patrilineal society 
to designate children as legitimate by virtue of adoption - as 
occurred in Egypt - or simply because they were born to one's 
wife, regardless of actual paternity.  
 As we have already seen, imagining a `natural' solidary 
kin-based community of shared paternal blood lent a putative 
physical substance to the group feeling that Ibn Khaldun wrote 
about.  This `cultural imaginary' provided a stabilizing and 
constructive model for aligning and motivating social actors in 
a shifting and perilous environment where any order at all was 
hard to achieve.  The codification of patrilineal blood rights 
in Muslim law (which stamped out all traces of earlier confusing 
cognatic or matrilineal cross-cutting rights, eliminated 
inheritance for adopted children, and required equal shares for 
the sons of slave women) was simply the logical final step in a 
long-term process of historical evolution toward a blood-based 
ideology of patrilineality. 
 The hypothesis of a causal correlation between status 
instability, a cultural ethic of competitive egalitarianism, a 
cultural idiom of natural difference located in blood 
inheritance, rejection of adoption, and the evolution of 
patrilineality and patriarchy is, of course, a tentative one, 
but whatever the causal nexus, it is clear that once paternal 
blood is accepted as the dominant metaphor for natural linkages 
between human beings and as an ultimate foundation for an 
individual's identity a number of consequences follow - none of 
them conducive to a congenial and egalitarian relationship 
between men and women.  
     Nonetheless, the ideology of the centrality of inherited 
male virtue rests upon an obvious and disturbing contradiction: 
i.e., even though genealogies and the official organizational 
model of the society take account only of men, the 
incontrovertible fact is that the patriline springs from the 
womb, and that women - outsiders to the patrilineage and men's 
supposed natural inferiors - are the real centers of the 
segmentary, masculine social structure in their role as child-
bearers and mothers. As Abdella Hammoudi writes, this 
paradoxical fact of life is "scandalous according to patriarchal 
norms and yet impossible to avoid"; its tensions force men to 
struggle continually "to transcend the structural contradiction 
between a patriarchal system and the physical reproduction of 
lineages" xvii.  In part, as I described above, these tensions 
are worked out in notions of `milk' relationships that bind 
together men outside of the lineage framework, providing 
emotionally powerful links between nobles and dependents through 
the mediation of women. They are also implicit in the Muslim 
claims for the umma, the womb within which all believers are 
bound in a fictive siblingship that - ideally at least - 
transcends patrilineality, and in the esoteric notions of the 
mystical transference of knowledge.  
 Yet, when all is said and done, blood ties within the 
patrilineage have remained the central model for unity and for 
social action in the Middle East.  That this is so, in spite of 
the many challenges raised, testifies to the extraordinary 
logical, organizational, and psychological power of 
conceptualizing the most crucial human relations as a matter of 
blood. 
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